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Subsequent to the passage of the Community Mental Health Act in
1963, the "Total Institutions" described by Goffman have for the most
part disappeared. Nonetheless, many writers charge that social control
is still the primary function of mental health programs, even those that
are identified as community-based. The new methods of control have not
received widespread attention. In community-based programs control is
operationalized in the form of "symbolic violence." This paper examines
the various factors that contribute to this style of violence.
Clearly mental hospitals have never been very pleasant
places. In the early days, these institutions were openly bar-
baric. Persons were placed in chains, beaten, and involved in
dehumanizing experiments (Scull, 1979). There is little doubt
that these activities were not therapeutic. The aim was primarily
to prevent the mentally impaired from spreading their affliction
to the remainder of society.
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Due to the efforts of eighteenth and nineteenth century
reformers, these conditions abated somewhat. In fact, various
humanitarian themes were given some credence. Improved
environmental conditions within hospitals were thought to con-
tribute to helping the mentally disabled. Patients appeared to
improve when placed in commodious surroundings, provided
with a systematic behavioral regimen, and given medical
attention.
Even though patients were no longer controlled through
physical abuse, newer and more subtle techniques of control
were developed. Michel Foucault (1965), for example, claims
these less obtrusive means of restraint were invented under the
guise of science. Consequently, ostensibly rational and tested
practices were adopted to subdue patients. Although these
strategies may have some medical justification, they are just
as intrusive and dehumanizing as those used in the past.
During the 1950s in the United States, a host of writers
confirmed Foucault's allegations (Kovel, 1980). Dehumanizing
acts against the emotionally impaired were tolerated because
of their alleged scientific nature. Thousands of lobotomies were
performed, while the use of chemical and electrical shock was
quite common. Additionally, the invention of Thorazine and
other psychoactive drugs allowed patients to be systematically
anesthetized. A sort of chemical straitjacket was now available.
And due to the increasing prescription of these drugs, hospital
wards became warehouses for those with emotional disabilities.
As Goffman (1961) illustrated, hospitals had become "to-
tal institutions." All that had changed was more sophisticated
modes of constraint became generally accepted. Accordingly,
the therapeutic worth of these institutions was certainly ques-
tionable. This state of affairs prompted President Kennedy to
announce in 1963 that a "bold new approach" was needed to
treat those suffering from mental illness (Mental Illness, 1963).
For research seemed to suggest that mistreatment and hopeless-
ness were still the norm on many wards (Pardeck & Murphy,
1992).
Following the passage of the Community Mental Health
Act in October of 1963, care for the mentally ill is supposed
to be more humane. Patients are to be treated in the "least
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restrictive environment." instead of confined to hospital wards.
To facilitate this change, community mental health centers have
been built throughout the country. In this way, therapy can be
provided close to home, possibly in a patient's neighborhood.
Furthermore, input is supposed to be sought from patients
throughout the therapeutic process. For example, needs assess-
ments are supposed to be regularly conducted, so that a com-
munity's view of a problem can be adequately understood.
As a result, services can be provided in a socially appropriate
manner.
At the institutional level certain policies are supposed to
be operative. For instance, clients are to be informed of their
rights upon entering therapy. And in order to insure that they
have consented to the course of remediation outlined by the
therapist, patients are required to sign their individualized treat-
ment plans. Additionally, quality assurance teams are to be
created to monitor care. Such scrutiny is designed to prevent
clients from languishing in inappropriate and ineffective treat-
ment modalities.
Subsequent to the passage of the Community Mental Health
Act, clients have the latitude to freely initiate and terminate
a therapeutic relationship. But as writers such as Scull (1984)
maintain, this "decarceration" has not been complete. Although
the total institutions described by Goffman may no longer be
as widespread, social control remains a key function of mental
health agencies. In this regard, Stanley Cohen (1985) contends
that control mechanisms have become more subtle and inclu-
sive. For the most part patients are not overtly accosted, but
instead are entrapped within a procedural and symbolic web.
Control is unobtrusive but just as effective as in the past.
Critics of community-based intervention have charged that
the control net is currently wider than ever before (Pardeck &
Murphy, 1993). While the proliferation of community mental
health programs has been chronicled and their capacity for
repression suggested, not much time has been devoted to dis-
cussing the actual mechanisms of control that are prevalent.
Clearly the vehicles of control have been altered, but in what
ways? The purpose of this paper is to address this question.
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The Nuances of Symbolic Violence
Social control is sustained in the modern world, according
to Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron (1977), at the sym-
bolic level. This demarche is thought to be much more effective
than traditional methods. After all, physical displays of force
tend to arouse the ire of the public, particularly in societies that
claim to be democratic. For in this type of polity, no one is
supposed to have the power to dictate how others will behave.
Therefore, control must appear to be rational, innocuous, and
support the common wealth.
But to say that control is symbolic does not mean simply that
symbols are used to enforce order. Significantly more is accom-
plished through symbolism than focusing persons' attention,
channeling emotions, and soliciting public support for an issue.
Much more important, reality is manipulated and opposition to
the status quo is subverted. Control is secured, in other words,
through symbolic violence.
This kind of violence occurs when persons are cajoled to
abandon their own views and accept another outlook. Overt
force does not provoke this shift, nor does the free exercise of
volition. Instead persons accept that their present orientation
is indicative of irrationality or some other dysfunction. In this
regard, little choice is involved in selecting new options, unless
clients want to be known as abnormal. Moreover, because the
basic values of these individuals are presumed to be problem-
atic, any challenges from those who receive treatment pose to
the dominant reality are discredited.
Fundamental to symbolic violence is that a particular inter-
pretation of reality is given a seignorial status. A specific outlook
is reinforced in such a way that it becomes almost inviolable.
Mental illness, for example, is circumscribed through the use
of medical protocol and identified as the complete absence of
reason. And anyone who has the particular configuration of
symptoms indicative of emotional disability is deemed inca-
pable of voicing meaningful opinions and interacting sensibly.
Presupposed by this entire process is a conception of reality that
is never doubted.
Clearly, appreciably more is encompassed by symbolic vio-
lence than the application of labels. First, different conceptions
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of reality are placed in an asymmetrical relationship. Second,
the dominant viewpoint is allowed to determine the meaning
of the rest. And third, the inferior views are stripped of legit-
imacy and rendered impotent. When persons are symbolically
violated, their actions are not simply categorized and responded
to in a unique manner. Instead, and far more devastating, their
existence is eviscerated.
A definition of symbolic violence, therefore, must contain
several elements. Building on the work of Bourdieu and
Passeron (1977), symbolic violence occurs when a person's
outlook is inferiorized and an asymmetrical relationship is es-
tablished between this individual's worldview and competing
conceptions of reality. This undermined viewpoint is aban-
doned out of logical necessity. The only reasonable action, in
short, would be to suppress an inferior position.
As should be noted, symbolic violence is not just a version
of coercion. Symbolic violence works from the inside out, while
the reverse is the case when behavior is coerced. When symbolic
violence is operative, persons may choose to have their values,
beliefs, or principles dissected and repressed. In fact, this out-
come is a regular part of many approaches to therapy. Such a re-
sult is truly violent, because self-destructive behavior is the end
product. Demeanor that a patient feels comfortable with may
be rejected, for example, because it conflicts with a clinically
established norm. The self may be systematically dismantled
and reconstructed according to a clinical ideal. Certainly such
reconstruction is violent, due to the symbolic violence against
the person's identity.
In actual practice, symbolic violence is often witnessed dur-
ing the standard therapeutic encounter (Vega & Murphy, 1990,
pp. 61-83). Psychiatrists and psychologists who possess a vari-
ety of diagnostic devices, drugs, and esoteric theories are easily
able to regulate their patients, without overt coercion. In point
of fact, many persons volunteer for treatment, in the hope of
gaining some insight into their fears and desires. Nonetheless,
the patient and therapist do not interact as fellow human beings,
who regularly share information and give each other advice. In-
stead, therapists are expected to modify behavior and normalize
persons.
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Behavioral change is based on a diagnosis that is believed
to represent an objective assessment. Politics, racism, or sexism
is unimportant. The facts of a case are evaluated and a judg-
ment is made. Indeed, patients are believed to be biased, while
therapists are value-free. What this means is that criticism is
deflected away from the psychological or medical establishment
by a scientific diagnosis. Additionally, due to the exalted posi-
tion of the therapist, any disagreement with a diagnosis calls
into further question a patient's credibility.
Obviously symbolic violence is a means of control that is
congruent with the tenets of community mental health, for the
direct manipulation of clients is supposed to have ceased. But
what about indirect coercion? If a patient's views are thoroughly
inferiorized by a diagnostic scheme, does this procedure consti-
tute the basis of social control? If patient input is believed to be
uninformed due to certain theoretical considerations, can the
claim be sustained that services have been truly humanized?
Inserting clients into a symbolic cage can be equally as dam-
aging as physical violence. Subverting patient input symboli-
cally and treating medical protocol as sacrosanct are inconsistent
with the spirit and the letter of the Community Mental Health
Act. Yet these and similar practices are present in mental health
agencies today (Vega & Murphy, 1990). Therefore, these means
of control must be illustrated and curtailed, if socially sensitive
care is to be delivered.
Contributors to Symbolic Control
Dualistic Theories
Both the sociological and psychological theories that have
dominated the intellectual scene prior to and since 1963
have been dualistic (Vega & Murphy, 1990, pp. 21-41). And due
to this shortcoming, real community-based treatment could not
be inaugurated. Remember that citizen involvement is supposed
to be sought at every stage of program planning. But how can
this occur when subjectivity is severed from objectivity, and the
former is thought to block access to valuable information?
Niklas Luhmann (1982, pp. 353-55) notes that traditional-
ists adhere to a "centered" image of society. In other words,
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order has been thought to be based on a foundation that is
devoid of situational contingencies. Durkheim (1983, pp. 82-85),
for instance, refers to this primordial condition as a "reality
sui generis." Without this absolute standard, the belief is that
the social world would rapidly devolve into chaos. For a vital
activity such as the maintenance of reality should not depend
on something as capricious as interpretation.
According to this view of order, social reality must be unas-
sailable. This is possible only if objective norms and laws are
available to socialize persons. Therefore, subjectivity or opin-
ion must be kept from defiling objectivity. If this approach is
successful, universal sanctions can be imposed on society.
The role citizens play in organizing services is seriously
curtailed, however, when the differentiation is made between
subjectivity and objectivity. And why should these persons be
consulted? According to this form of dualism, rational planning
can only be impaired by recognizing their opinions. Because
subjectivity embodies various values, beliefs, and commitments,
placing clients or other citizens at the center of an intervention
would be considered a sign of incompetence. Surely no one
wants to earn this unflattering reputation.
As a result, those who are thought to be objective, due to
their managerial skills or expertise in research, have retained
control of planning (Pilotta, Murphy, Jones, & Wilson, 1983).
This situation will not likely change until the subjective-ob-
jective bifurcation is abandoned. Actually, many contemporary
critics insist that this dualism is outmoded, because an essential
relationship exists between knowledge and interpretation. For
someone such as Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984, pp. 9-10), nothing
escapes the impact of language. Every style of knowledge, even
that associated with science, reflects a "language game." And
once the human presence is understood to mediate thoroughly
everything that is known, information is relativized.
Since all knowledge is shaped by interpretation, no source
of input can claim to be inherently more objective than any
other. Therefore, the worth of information must be judged in
terms of its utility, as opposed to its pedigree. Hence citizen
participation is not necessarily antagonistic to rational planning.
Contacting citizens or allowing patients to formulate a treatment
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regimen does not automatically call into question the validity
of an intervention.
Professionalization
The introduction of multidisciplinary treatment planning
was also a part of the movement toward community-based
intervention. The purpose of this strategy is to diversify the
information available to practitioners and patients. As a part
of expanding the range of input, the advocates of clients could
be members of the treatment team. In some instances, particu-
larly in ethnic neighborhoods, those who are bilingual serve as
translators for the therapist. At other times, "cultural brokers"
are invited to provide insight into a patient's background and
social milieu (Lefley, 1984).
Yet this undertaking has had only marginal success. One of
the reasons why multidisciplinary treatment planning has not
worked as anticipated relates to the emphasis that has been
placed on professionalization (Vega & Murphy, 1990). The re-
cent proliferation of new disciplines, degrees, and licensing and
accreditation requirements has been phenomenal. Almost daily,
new regulations are unveiled.
Yet in a significant way, the growth of these professional
standards has been detrimental to patients. That is, patients
are pushed to the periphery of the treatment team. Why this
is happening is understandable. Most of those who receive
services are not well educated, are often inarticulate, and do
not possess a wide variety of social skills. Simply put, most
clients are not professionals, and thus their ability to contribute
meaningfully to the formulation of a treatment plan is viewed
with skepticism. In contrast to practitioners, the knowledge
possessed by citizens and patients is considered to be unreliable.
One of the key purposes of professionalization is to reduce
discretion. Similar protocol are to be followed by trained practi-
tioners in every situation. As a result, standardized actions are
encouraged. But what would happen if patients were included
in evaluations? Due to their lack of professional socialization,
their responses would not be predictable. Consistency would
thus be threatened.
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As a consequence of professionalization, particular knowl-
edge has been elevated in importance. This information, how-
ever, is not distributed throughout society. Clients and citizens
are thus diminished in importance, because their knowledge
base does not usually contain input that is valued by practition-
ers. Undermined by professionalization, in short, is knowledge
that is outside of the limited realm created by this process of
formalization.
Science and the Inferiorization of Clients
During the 1960s and 1970s the medical model was con-
stantly under attack (Ingleby, 1980). This challenge to the
dominance of medical science in the treatment of clients has
abated during the past 10 years. At the National Institute of
Mental Health, for example, planners who have a sociological
orientation have become almost extinct. In fact, the majority
of funding nowadays is directed to discovering the underlying
physiological causes of mental illness. Genetic and psychophar-
macological research has become quite popular (Pardeck &
Murphy, 1993).
Accompanying this shift in emphasis is the belief that
becoming increasingly scientific is crucial for making advances
in the study of mental illness. Some critics even go so far as
to charge that progress is delayed by wasting time and money
on the development of social, as opposed to medical, interven-
tions. Obviously in this environment not much effort will be
devoted to understanding how patients or communities view
their problems.
The stress that is now placed on becoming scientific is also
manifested in other ways. The computer, for example, has
become part of practically every area of service delivery. Many
tasks, including in some cases the therapeutic relationship, have
been completely computerized (Pardeck & Murphy, 1986).
The purpose of employing this technology is to improve the
accuracy of clinical judgments, as a result of organizing a vast
amount of information in a systematic way. With the adoption
of "expert systems," for example, the interrater reliability of clin-
icians is cited to be greatly enhanced (Murphy & Pardeck, 1989).
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To use Max Horkheimer's (1982, pp. 132-189) phrase, this
adoption of computer technology represents the most recent
"attack on metaphysics." By this he means that the social or
interpretive side of any venture is obscured. At the peak of the
anti psychiatry movement, during the late 1960s to the mid-
dle 1970s, clinical diagnoses were assumed to be replete with
political motives (Sedgwick, 1982). Women, ethnic minorities,
and a myriad of other groups were beginning to question the
legitimacy of these decisions. Stated differently, these judgments
were no longer thought to be value-free.
But once the computer enters the scene this criticism is
minimized. For most citizens are enamored of logic and math-
ematics, and thus have difficulty believing that computers are
biased. While criticizing this commonly held view of computers,
Ashley Montague quips that the GIGO principle should be
interpreted to mean "Garbage in, Gospel out" (Roszak, 1986,
p. 120). For by following the schematics utilized in computer
programs, making decisions is not thought to involve gaining
critical insight into a problem. Doubtless, a person would have
to be an expert at programming to understand how information
can be distorted by computerization. But most clients and their
families and friends do not have this skill. Therefore, in many
ways treatment has been reified through computerization.
Due to the alleged comprehensiveness, accuracy, and objec-
tivity of the information generated by computers, everyday
experiences pale by comparison. As a result, computers are of-
ten treated as providing an unquestionably valid "second opin-
ion" (Murphy & Pardeck, 1986a). Instead of consulting a variety
of sources, clients rely mostly on computer printouts to verify
a practitioner's diagnosis. Considering the public's fascination
with technology, this finding should not be shocking. Nonethe-
less, the different experiences, belief systems, and commitments
involved in making clinical decisions are ostensibly neutralized.
What can a client add to the data compiled by a computer?
Most professionals appear to suggest little (Pardeck & Murphy,
1993). Therefore, data processing requirements have begun to
dictate the type and amount of information that is included in
clinical activities (Murphy & Pardeck, 1986b). At one time, long
and complex interviews were conducted regularly to obtain a
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holistic view of a client. But this approach to data collection has
lost popularity since the onset of widespread computerization.
For these so-called soft instruments are not considered to be
very reliable by a large segment of practitioners. The knowledge
that is procured is often ambiguous and subject to a variety of
interpretations. Such uncertainty is not thought to be conducive
to making sound judgments.
This desire to be objective has resulted in evaluation coming
to be almost synonymous with testing (Matarazzo, 1986). Com-
pared to ethnographic interviews, tests appear to be rigorous
and thus unbiased. This perception has been reinforced by the
development of cdmputer programs that are able to admin-
ister, score, and interpret tests. Through the computerization
of testing, the illusion has been perpetrated that tests provide
decision makers with the most accurate and comprehensive
information available. Additionally, those who control these
tests have gained enormous status in agencies, because of their
close association with scientific knowledge that is deemed to be
extremely valuable (Pardeck & Murphy, 1986).
Through computerization the separation of fact from value
has been encouraged. Since computers are machines and sup-
posedly impervious to values, information that is computerized
is used to counteract the influence of opinions. Thus the sup-
pression of knowledge that is not programmable is thought to
be entirely justified, because this input lacks exact parameters
and is not scientific. Because science is presumed to be the
paragon of rationality, all other kinds of knowledge are treated
as superficial. Following this truncation of knowledge, patients
cannot be allowed to influence significantly the organization
of services.
Bureaucracy
Most mental health agencies are bureaucracies and thus are
structurally organized in a manner similar to the older state
hospitals. A major difference between these institutions is that
community-based programs are not as expansive as hospitals.
Nonetheless, the continued presence of bureaucracy has fos-
tered the implosion of knowledge, in a manner identical to
dualistic theories, professionalization, and computerization.
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In order to appreciate this critique, bureaucracy must not
be viewed simply as an organizational or management style.
Rather, as explained by Max Weber (1958, p. 54), bureaucracy
represents a unique conceptual scheme or "cosmos." Therefore,
changes in organizational size may not have any impact on
reducing bureaucracy. This mode of conceptualization can thus
be found in practically every organizational setting.
Given the negative view of the bureaucracy, what are the
benefits to be derived from this way of conceiving organiza-
tions? Claude Lefort (1986, p. 222) answers this query succinctly
when he states that bureaucracies appear to be "ahistorical."
His point is that because every activity is formalized as a result
of bureaucratization, exact categories are available to process
information and make job assignments. For example, due to
the rigorous division of labor in bureaucracies, redundancy
is thought to be avoided and efficiency improved. According
to Lefort, criteria for decision making are introduced through
bureaucratization that do not appear to be influenced by situa-
tional exigencies. Hence regulation is believed to be ultimately
rational.
Yet this increasing rationalization, according to Weber, can
also begin to cripple an organization. This is particularly the
case if input is supposed to be sought from throughout an
agency. For job assignments are made on the basis that require-
ments are not randomly distributed. Stated differently, strict
adherence to the division of labor must be enforced, or persons
will not be aligned to the proper jobs and efficiency will be
compromised.
As long as organizational rationality is conceived in this
manner, citizens and patients will exert little control over the
intervention process. Why? Both of these groups are tangential
to the operation of a bureaucracy, for they lack the training
necessary for them to occupy influential positions. And if their
role in an agency would be changed simply by fiat, no one
would benefit. The rationale for this conclusion should be ob-
vious: persons would be placed in jobs for which they are
unqualified. Therefore, the operation of the entire organization
may be jeopardized.
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As long as bureaucracy and rationality are equated, the
knowledge essential for planning will remain within a cabal
of experts. Disassembling the rigid division of labor, in short,
will not be viewed as prudent. Alternatives to bureaucracy have
been proposed, but these options will not receive serious atten-
tion until organizational efficiency is rethought. Flat organiza-
tions, for example, must no longer be understood to decrease
discipline and rationality. But the decentralization of authority
is crucial, if citizens and patients are to influence significantly
intervention activities. Novel input must not be curtailed by an
outmoded division of labor.
Symbolic Violence in Practice
In both theory and practice the dualism that supports sym-
bolic violence is difficult to overcome. After all, the prospect of
discovering and possessing an unadulterated-apolitical, neu-
tral, and thus valid-knowledge conception is what sustains
symbolic violence. Recent talk about holistic intervention, sys-
tems theory, and constructivism, for example, circumvent this
issue. Therefore, the door is left open for certain knowledge
bases, methodologies, or images of the organization to retain
a seignorial status, thereby curtailing attempts on the part of
practitioners to become more inclusive.
For example, a lot of discussion has taken place during
the past few years about TQM or Total Quality Management
(Berwick, Godfrey, & Roessner, 1991). In a variety of health care
settings, this practice is thought to be a panacea for organiza-
tional difficulties. The problem is that drastic managerial change
is required if the widespread worker (or client) participation
is to occur that is vital for TQM to succeed. For a variety of
reasons-professionalism, fear of power shifts, or a lack of confi-
dence in staff workers-the traditional bureaucracy has not been
seriously challenged. An analysis of most organizational charts
found in social service agencies will confirm this claim (Murphy
& Pardeck, 1986a). The result is that staff input barely touches
the core of organizational life, not to mention what clients have
to say. Most staff persons are peripheralized because of the
perceived need to retain a managerially sound and objective
image of order.
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The same dualism is found in much of the research on men-
tal health issues that is currently funded (Vega & Murphy, 1990).
It is no secret that during the 1980s the biomedical model was
resurrected. Although biochemical considerations were sup-
posed to be viewed simply as one set of factors among oth-
ers, a pluralistic approach to comparing knowledge bases was
not encouraged. Due to the prestige of biomedicine, and the
accompanying positivism, non-medical variables and opinions
were diminished in importance. Clients were either expected
to relent and accept invasive treatments, based on physiolog-
ical causality, or pursue alternative remedies that are heavily
stigmatized.
In point of fact, Pardeck, Murphy, and Chung (in press)
found recently that patients were unable to question extensively
the judgements of treatment professionals. Even though pa-
tients are supposed to have an integral role in developing their
treatment plans, this involvement is not often present. Clients
reside at the margin of the treatment planning process and
express hostility about the manner in which they are treated.
Conversations with professionals, in sum, tended to be short,
laden with jargon, incomprehensible, and thus insensitive to
the client's wishes. Treatment accordingly turned into nothing
more than custodial care.
Clients were not approached in their own terms, but
instead their complaints were transformed into diagnostic id-
iom. Furthermore, practitioners felt uncomfortable believing a
client until his or her descriptions were compared to labora-
tory or psychological tests. Once these objective measures were
received, practitioners exhibited some confidence about making
an assessment. A patient's insights could not be trusted until a
reliable or scientific evaluation could be made.
In the end, the organizational and clinical status quo is
preserved without firing a shot, so to speak. Any opinions that
do not fit nicely into the body of conventional wisdom are
systematically inferiorized and overshadowed by input that is
allegedly more trustworthy. Only an unreasonable person
would refuse to recognize that difference in quality between
those two sources of information continues to give credence to
unscientific views.
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What practitioners must begin to understand is that allow-
ing diverse types of information, along with different persons,
to be introduced into the treatment setting does not necessarily
culminate in pluralism. A proper environment must be fostered,
accordingly, where disparate kinds of input can receive a fair
hearing. In other words, the marketplace of ideas must be de-
mocratized, thus enabling every type of information to be in-
troduced into a discussion without bias. The source or pedigree
of data, for example, should not determine the utility of certain
knowledge (Pardeck, Murphy, & Callaghan, 1994).
With regard to the use of computers by practitioners, for
example, recent research has revealed some interesting insights
(Pardeck, Umfress, & Murphy, 1990). Despite the fact that prac-
titioners have minimal contact with computers and do not com-
prehend how they really function, intervention was thought
overwhelmingly to be upgraded by the use of these devices.
A halo effect was found, due possibly to the apparent scientific
character of computerized knowledge bases, that resulted in a
favorable attitude toward this technology. In short, computer-
ized knowledge has more face validity, and possibly inherently
wider applicability, than other forms of knowledge. But such
a predisposition contributes to imploding the search strategy
used by practitioners to discover the knowledge that will be
included in their decision-making processes. The imagery of the
computer, therefore, was able to subvert ostensibly less objec-
tive sources of data. This prospect is the hallmark of symbolic
violence.
Conclusion
According to Foucault (1965), social control in the modern
world has become more rational and less obtrusive. For the most
part, control is not enacted through the use of brute force. In-
stead, science, technology, and reason have been enlisted for this
purpose. Subsequently, practices that are inoffensive reinforce
reality and undermine critiques of the status quo. This seems to
be the case in mental health agencies (Vega & Murphy, 1990).
The dehumanization of clients does not necessarily extend
from incompetence, malicious intentions or actions, equipment
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failure, or a general lack of humanness. Hence challenges are
posed for those who want to study how patients are restrained
in community-based programs. Specifically, attention must be
directed to comprehending how reality is truncated by practices
that are not overtly political or pernicious.
In the case of community mental health agencies, through
rational and well-orchestrated maneuvers clients remain mar-
ginal to the administration of services. Reason and irrationality
are juxtaposed in such a way that patients are effectively dis-
armed. Due to the recent professionalization of services, along
with the emphasis placed on science and computer technology,
these persons have become viewed as impediments to rational
management. In Lyotard's (1985, p. 98) words, nonpractitioners
have been symbolically "terrorized".
As is noted by Lewis and Darling (1990), the rhetoric of
community-based treatment has obscured what is actually oc-
curring in these programs. Community agencies may be smaller,
located in neighborhoods, and less overtly barbaric than the
mental institutions of the past, but these newer facilities are
just as coercive and intrusive. Conflict with citizens and clients
is neatly resolved, while attention is diverted away from the
mental health system. The range of discourse and criticism is
simply restricted, because science and technology are anathema
to the ethical or political issues that are related to controlling
persons. Why would criticism be counseled, when the scientific
pursuit of truth is underway?
But as long as the focus is maintained on technique, writes
Baudrillard, a lot may appear to change while everything re-
mains the same (Kellner, 1989, p. 11). In other words, advances
will be made in technology while the de facto manipulation
of clients goes unchallenged. Simply because intervention pro-
grams are rationally administered, procedures are scientifically
monitored, and the latest assessment techniques are used does
not signal automatically that mistreatment has ceased. Neither
patients nor citizens should be silenced by the apparent neutral-
ity of science and technology. The ideology of science should
not be allowed to restrict patients input and their control of
mental health services.
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